Last updated on: 2026-01-28

Applicant Information

Full Legal Name: Canadian Internet Registration Authority
Doing Business As: Hello Registry – CIRA
Business URL: https://cira.ca
Primary Business Phone: +1 877-860-1411
Primary Business Email: info@cira.ca
Country Code of Location: CA
Application Information
Application Type MAIN
Application Status Cleared
Technical Screening Status Cleared
RST Status Cleared
RST general.registryDataModel used in technical testing maximum
RST Host Model used in technical testing objects
Application Questions
MAIN.1.1.Third-Party Certificate
Does or will this RSP have a publicly verifiable, third-party certification (e.g. ISO 27001) held directly by the organization and relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.3.Physical Access Controls
Does or will this RSP have processes and controls to manage physical access to infrastructure and systems, including building access controls, security cameras and/or other sensors, physical environmental monitoring and safety equipment, and alarm systems related to the physical infrastructure?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.4.System Access Controls
Does or will this RSP have processes and controls to manage non-physical access to infrastructure, including network access from both internal systems and external Internet systems, intrusion detection systems, security information and event management systems, network firewalls, network segmentation and isolation, user identification and authentication, and authorization schemes?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.5.Vendor Management
Does or will this RSP have processes and controls pertaining to the selection of vendors and equipment suppliers, management and maintenance of assets while in use, procurement of assets, and safe disposal of assets?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.6.Cryptographic Material
Does or will this RSP routinely renew and keep safe all cryptographic material necessary for the operation of the RSP?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.7.Secure Data At-Rest
Does or will this RSP secure (e.g. encryption, tamper detection, etc…) at-rest data relevant to the operation of the RSP, including but not limited to DNSSEC if applicable?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.8.Secure Data In-Transit
Does or will this RSP secure (e.g. encryption, tamper detection, etc…) in-transit data relevant to the operation of the RSP, including but not limited to DNSSEC if applicable?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.9.Virtualization Controls
If applicable, does or will this RSP have security controls for data in virtualized environments, including controls relevant to both on-premises or private virtualization environments as well as public clouds, network isolation, memory isolation, process isolation, and hypervisor access controls?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.10.CISO
Does or will this RSP have a senior executive primarily in charge of and responsible for security?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.12.Background Checks
Does or will this RSP conduct background checks, both initial and on-going, of personnel and vendors relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.14.BCP 38
Does or will this RSP implement BCP 38?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.15.Secure Routing
Does or will this RSP implement routing security of some nature, such as automated route filters, RPKI route origin validation, or other operational practices defined by the Internet Society and Global Cyber Alliance's Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.1.16.KSK Rollovers
Describe the processes and procedures to be used to practice and ensure a successful KSK rollover for both emergency and non-emergency situations, including coordination with the DNSSEC RSP and IANA.
Response
KSK rollover is carried out every year, as described in section 6.5 of CIRA's DNSSEC Practice Statement for gTLDs. In order to make update to the HSM, We need a HSM ceremony with System Administrator, Security Officer, and Witness present to make the changes. During the HSM ceremony, we have ten years' worth of KSK pre-generated and store and sync with the HSM. Normal KSK rolling process: 1. Backup the OpenDNSSec infrastructure 2. List the existing KSK for the applicable zones 3. Start the KSK roll with OpenDNSSec 4. Wait for the first zone publish to be completed with the new KSK published 5. Submit RZM request on IANA portal to add new KSK 6. Wait for the RZM change to be completed 7. Wait for the new KSK to be ready and using for double signing in OpenDNSSec 8. Submit RZM request on IANA portal to remove old KSK 9. Wait for the RZM change to be completed 10. Backup the OpenDNSSec infrastructure again 11. Complete Switch to new KSK on OpenDNSSec Emergency KSK rolling process: 1. Backup the OpenDNSSec infrastructure 2. List the existing KSK for the applicable zones 3. Reduce the new KSK pre-publish time from 7 days to 24 hours 4. Start the KSK roll with OpenDNSSec 5. Wait for the first zone publish to be completed with the new KSK published 6. Submit RZM request on IANA portal to add new KSK 7. Wait for the RZM change completed 8. Wait for the new KSK to be ready and using for double signing in OpenDNSSec 9. Submit RZM request on IANA portal to remove old KSK 10. Wait for the RZM change to be completed 11. Backup OpenDNSSec infrastructure again 12. Complete switch to new KSK on OpenDNSSec In the event of a compromised KSK, CIRA, acting as the main RSP, will immediately notify IANA to ensure they are aware of the situation and aligned with the emergency KSK rollover process. The DNSSEC RSP will initiate the KSK rollover. If CIRA is the DNSSEC RSP, the emergency rollover steps outlined earlier in this document will be followed. If the DNSSEC RSP is an external party, CIRA will promptly inform the relavent stake holders and collaborate with the DNSSEC RSP to validate the new DS record. CIRA will also work with the registry owner to ensure the updated DS record is correctly published in the Root Zone Management (RZM) system. During an emergency KSK rollover, CIRA has multiple channels available to contact ICANN. To expedite the process, CIRA will first open a support ticket and then follow up with a direct phone call to ensure prompt attention and resolution. Once the new KSK is actively used for signing, and the TTL of all RRSIGs generated with the compromised KSK has expired, CIRA will coordinate with the registry owner to remove the compromised DS record from the root zone. Steps in Scheduled KSK Rollover: Active Phase (365 days) The current KSK is used to sign the zone for one year. This is the normal operational period before rollover begins. Pre-publish Phase (30 days) A new KSK is generated and published in the zone alongside the old key. During this time, the old key still signs the zone, but the new key is visible to resolvers so they can trust it before it starts signing. Purpose: Prevent validation failures by giving resolvers time to update trust anchors. Rollover (Switch) After the pre-publish period, the new KSK starts signing the zone. The old KSK stops signing but remains published for a short time. Post-publish Phase (30 days) The old KSK remains in the zone (not signing) for 30 days. This ensures resolvers that haven’t updated yet can still validate signatures during the transition.
MAIN.2.2.Standard Hardware Maintenance
Does or will this RSP have documented, regular, and active practices for the maintenance of hardware relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.3.Standard Software Maintenance
Does or will this RSP have documented, regular, and active practices for the maintenance, upgrading, and patching of software relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.4.Standard Hardware Lifecycle
Does or will this RSP have documented, regular, and active practices for the lifecycle of hardware relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.5.Secure Software Development
Does or will this RSP have documented, regular, and active practices for the secure development of software?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.6.Hardware Maintenance Contingency
Does or will this RSP have documented contingency plans for extraordinary scenarios regarding the maintenance of hardware relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.7.Software Maintenance Contingency
Does or will this RSP have documented contingency plans for extraordinary scenarios regarding the maintenance, upgrading, and patching of software relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.8.Hardware Lifecycle Contingency
Does or will this RSP have documented contingency plans for extraordinary scenarios regarding the lifecycle of hardware relevant to the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.9.Software Development Contingency
Does or will this RSP have documented contingency plans for extraordinary scenarios regarding the development of software?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.10.IaC
Does or will this RSP use Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC) to manage all systems relevant to operation of the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.2.11.Automated Orchestration
Does or will this RSP use automated orchestration to manage all systems relevant to the operation of the registry services under application?
Response
Yes
MAIN.3.3.Tier III Data Center
Does or will this RSP have at least two Tier III (as defined here: https://uptimeinstitute.com/tiers) or equivalent data centers having no inter-dependencies?
Response
Yes
Attachments
MAIN.4.3.On-site Backups
Does or will this RSP have on-site backups of registration data?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.4.Off-site Backups
Does or will this RSP have off-site backups of registration data?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.5.Data Retention
Does or will this RSP practice data retention policies with regard to backups of registration data?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.6.Registration Data Backups
Does or will this RSP practice documented standards regarding media and data backups for registration data?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.7.Recovery Practices
Does or will this RSP practice regularly scheduled validation of registration data backups, separately from recovery practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.8.Scheduled Recovery
Does or will this RSP practice regularly scheduled recovery of registration data backups?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.9.Production Data
Does or will this RSP forbid the use of production data in testing and/or development environments?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.12.Encrypted Registration Data At-Rest
Does or will this RSP encrypt registration data at-rest in the data store?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.13.Encrypted Registration Data In-Transit
Does or will this RSP encrypt registration data in-transit to and from the data store?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.14.Cryptographic Material Renewal
Does or will this RSP regularly and frequently renew the cryptographic material used for the encryption of registration data both at-rest and in-transit with regard to the data store in accordance with industry best common practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.15.Cryptographic Material Handling
Does or will this RSP keep safe the cryptographic material used for the encryption of registration data both at-rest and in-transit with regard to the data store in accordance with industry best common practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.4.16.Cryptographic Algorithms
Does or will this RSP use modern and known-secure cryptographic algorithms for the encryption of registration data at-rest and in-transit with regard to the data store?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.1.RFC 5730
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 5730 (“Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.2.RFC 5731
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 5731 (“Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Domain Name Mapping”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.3.RFC 5734
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 5734 (“Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Transport over TCP”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.4.RFC 5910
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 5910 (“Domain Name System (DNS) Security Extensions Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.5.RFC 5732
If applicable, does or will this RSP implement RFC 5732 (“Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Host Mapping”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.6.RFC 5733
If applicable, does or will this RSP implement RFC 5733 (“Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Contact Mapping”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.7.RFC 8334
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 8334 (“Launch Phase Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.8.RFC 8748
If applicable, does or will this RSP implement RFC 8748 (“Registry Fee Extension for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.9.EPP Contacts
Does or will this RSP forbid access to contacts via EPP to registrars other than the sponsoring registrar?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.10.EPP Extensions
Provide a list of all EPP extensions to be used that are registered in the IANA EPP extensions registry, and an attestation that all EPP extensions to be used are registered with the IANA as per RFC 7451 (“Extension Registry for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol”).
Response
CIRA confirms that all EPP extensions used for Registry System Testing (RST) and in support of gTLDs will be registered in the IANA EPP Extension Registry, in accordance with RFC 7451. The following extensions are currently registered and will be used: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rgp-1.0 – RFC 3915 urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:secDNS-1.1 – RFC 5910 urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:launch-1.0 – regext-launchphase urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:epp:fee-1.0 – RFC 8748 urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:idn-1.0 – This refers to the “Internationalized Domain Name Mapping for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)” extension, which is registered and documented here. CIRA has also submitted registration requests to IANA for the following extensions: urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:fury-2.1 – CIRA Fury 2.1 Extension urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:fury-rgp-1.0 – CIRA Fury RGP Extension These submissions follow the process outlined in RFC 7451 and are currently under review. CIRA will ensure that these extensions are listed in the IANA registry prior to their use in any gTLD operations. We confirm that all EPP extensions used by CIRA for RST and gTLD support will be listed in the IANA EPP Extension Registry.
MAIN.5.11.Unregistered EPP Extensions
Does or will this RSP forgo the use of any EPP extensions which are not registered with the IANA as per RFC 7451 (“Extension Registry for the Extensible Provisioning Protocol”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.12.EPP Performance
Does or will this RSP implement and operate EPP according to the performance requirements defined in the standards established in Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.13.EPP Equal Access
Does or will this RSP have controls to prevent EPP misuse and ensure all registrars have fair and equal access to EPP per the standards established in Specification 9 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.15.RFC 9325
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 9325 (“Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)”) notwithstanding RFC 5734 (“Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) Transport over TCP”)? Note: while RFC 9325 covers TLS and DTLS, EPP only uses TLS.
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.16.EPP Cryptographic Material Renewal
Does or will this RSP regularly and frequently renew the cryptographic material used to secure EPP communications in accordance with industry best common practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.17.EPP Cryptographic Material Handling
Does or will this RSP keep safe the cryptographic material used to secure EPP communication in accordance with industry best common practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.18.EPP Reporting
Does or will this RSP meet the standards established in Specification 3 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with respect to EPP?
Response
Yes
MAIN.5.19.EPP Virtualization
Does or will this RSP compartmentalize (e.g. virtualization) the EPP service in such a manner that each compartment (e.g. containers, virtual machines, physical machines) is dedicated to EPP (excluding system services such as monitoring, remote access and NTP)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.1.RFC 7480
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 7480 (“HTTP Usage in the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.2.RFC 7481
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 7481 (“Security Services for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.3.Current RFC 8521
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 8521 (“Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Object Tagging”) for all currently operated gTLDs?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.4.Future RFC 8521
Does this RSP plan to continue to implement RFC 8521 (“Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Object Tagging”) for all gTLDs operated in the future?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.5.RFC 9082
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 9082 (“Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.6.RFC 9083
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 9083 (“JSON Responses for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.7.Current RFC 9224
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 9224 (“Finding the Authoritative Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Service”) for all currently operated gTLDs?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.8.Future RFC 9224
Will this RSP implement RFC 9224 (“Finding the Authoritative Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Service”) for all gTLDs operated in the future?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.9.RDAP Technical Implementation Guide
Does or will this RSP implement the ICANN gTLD RDAP Technical Implementation Guide?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.10.RDAP Response Profile
Does or will this RSP implement the ICANN gTLD RDAP Response Profile?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.11.RDAP Extensions
Provide a list of all RDAP extensions to be used.
Response
CIRA uses the following: icann_rdap_response_profile_1 icann_rdap_technical_implementation_guide_1 redacted (only when a response contains redacted information)
MAIN.6.12.Unregistered RDAP Extensions
Does or will this RSP forgo the use of any RDAP extensions which are not registered with the IANA as per RFC 7480 (“HTTP Usage in the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)”)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.13.RDAP Performance
Does or will this RSP meet the standards established in the Service Level Agreements specified in Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with regard to RDAP?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.14.RDAP Data Mining
Does or will this RSP implement methods to prevent mining of registration data via RDAP?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.15.RFC 9325
Does or will this RSP implement RFC 9325 (“Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)”) with respect to RDAP?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.16.RDAP Cryptographic Material Renewal
Does or will this RSP regularly and frequently renew the cryptographic material used to secure RDAP communications in accordance with industry best common practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.17.RDAP Cryptographic Material Handling
Does or will this RSP keep safe the cryptographic material used to secure RDAP communication in accordance with industry best common practices?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.18.RDAP Reporting
Does or will this RSP meet the standards established in Specification 3 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with respect to RDAP?
Response
Yes
MAIN.6.19.RDAP Virtualization
Does or will this RSP compartmentalize (e.g. virtualization) the RDAP service in such a manner that each compartment (e.g. containers, virtual machines, physical machines) is dedicated to RDAP (excluding system services such as monitoring, remote access and NTP)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.7.3.IPv4 RDAP
Does or will this RSP meet the standards established in Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with regard to RDAP and IPv4?
Response
Yes
MAIN.7.4.IPv4 EPP
Does or will this RSP meet the standards established in Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with regard to EPP and IPv4?
Response
Yes
MAIN.7.5.IPv6 RDAP
Does or will this RSP meet the standards established in Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with regard to RDAP and IPv6?
Response
Yes
MAIN.7.6.IPv6 EPP
Will this RSP meet the standards established in Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024) with regard to EPP and IPv6 if requested by a registrar?
Response
Yes
MAIN.8.1.Domain Registration Abuse
Will this RSP provide tools and mechanisms to Registry Operators for the purposes of automated processing and identification of abusive domain registrations.
Response
Yes
MAIN.8.2.EPP and RDAP Status Values
Describe the EPP and RDAP status values as they relate to domain name registrations considered to be abusive registrations and those not considered to be abusive registrations.
Response
Abusive registrations may be policed by the registrar and registry operator by usage of statuses clientHold, serverHold. This will ensure the domain will not be published in the zone. Responses for EPP and RDAP will look something like what is provided in the attached PDF.
Attachments
MAIN.9.1.URS
Describe the EPP and RDAP status values and their applicability to Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS).
Response
Answer is more than 4000 characters, uploading a document with all the information.
Attachments
MAIN.9.2.RFC 9361
Does or will this RSP implement the Registry Operator-related elements of RFC9361
Response
Yes
MAIN.10.1.Registration Lifecycle
Describe all potential registration lifecycle(s) of domain names supported in the system.
Response
The following is a list of RGP statuses/stages of life (SOL) supported in the system: addPeriod autoRenewPeriod renewPeriod transferPeriod redemptionPeriod pendingRestore pendingDelete registered See Diagram 10.1 for a detailed diagram showing the domain name life cycle.
Attachments
MAIN.10.2.Domain Registration Values
Describe the registration lifecycle(s) of domain names with respect to EPP status values and RDAP status values.
Response
Please see attached tables and images for the CIRA Domain Lifecycle.
Attachments
MAIN.10.3.Nameserver Registration Values
Describe the nameserver host lifecycle, including relevance to EPP and RDAP status values, with respect to the lifecycle of domain names. This should include a description of nameservers as either attributes of domains or as host objects.
Response
Answer is longer than 4000 characters, please see attached document and table for answer
Attachments
MAIN.10.4.Contact Registration Values
If applicable, describe the contact lifecycle, including relevance to EPP and RDAP status values, with respect to the lifecycle of domain names and nameservers. Include a description of the deletion of orphaned contacts.
Response
Answer is longer than 4000 characters, please see attached document and table.
Attachments
MAIN.10.5.Orphaned Glue
Does or will this RSP be capable of removing orphaned glue in accordance with the standards established in Specification 6 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024)?
Response
Yes
MAIN.10.7.Data Escrow
Describe how this RSP will meet the standards established in Specification 2 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024), and describe any other data escrow processes. This includes escrow extensions for data related additional registry services.
Response
We are compliant with Specification 2 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (v2024) concerning the escrow process. See attached table. We are fully compliant with Legal requirements as outlined in PART B.
Attachments
MAIN.11.1.Registry Continuity Exercise
Does or will this RSP regularly exercise registry continuity actions?
Response
Yes
MAIN.11.3.Transfer of Operations
Does or will this RSP be capable of transferring all applicable operations to another RSP as defined by the Material Subcontracting Arrangement Technical Questions?
Response
Yes
MAIN.11.4.EBERO
Does or will this RSP participate in coordinated Emergency Back-end Registry Operator (EBERO) transitions, including but not limited to maintaining the DNSSEC chain of trust, of hosted gTLDs when the business relationship of this RSP and the Registry Operator is not in good standing?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.1.Internal Monitoring
Does or will this RSP monitor for faults inside its own network?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.2.External Monitoring
Does or will this RSP monitor for faults from a point outside any of its own networks?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.3.Fault Triage
Does or will this RSP have documented processes for aggregation and triage of faults?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.4.Fault Mitigation
Does or will this RSP have documented processes to mitigate faults once detected?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.6.Fault Minimization
Does or will this RSP have processes to minimize faults during maintenance of systems, including both automated processes and manual change control processes?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.7.On-call Staff
Does or will this RSP have personnel capable of reacting to and mitigating faults 24 hours per day of every day of every year of service?
Response
Yes
MAIN.12.8.Service Disruptions
Provide documentation regarding any RSP functions currently being served for any gTLD, the domain names of the gTLDs, and all service disruptions for each gTLD in the past six months, where a service disruption is defined by Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement (version 2024).
Response
No, We have experienced no service disruptions as defined by Specification 10 of the ICANN Registry Agreement.